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For the full text of this licence, please go to: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 1. Introduction 1.1. Fault Tolerance. Fault tolerance is about dealing with faults in technical systems . Its goal is to prevent a component fault from becoming a system failure (Blanke et al., 2001) . So far, most theoretical considerations have focused on sensor faults. If a sensor signal is incorrect, the faulty signal can be ignored, and a redundant sensor can be used instead with minimal eect on the system. Therefore redundant sensors are very eective at reducing the probability of a fault aecting the system function (Frank, 1990) .
Actuators however can fail in several dierent ways or fault modes, and the resulting eect on the system cannot be ignored. For instance, a valve blocked in the closed position can be tolerated by means of opening a redundant valve in parallel. However, if a valve is blocked in the open position, a parallel redundancy cannot be used to compensate, because a valve connected in series needs to be closed. Therefore, the actuator redundancy has to be studied for a network of actuators, and the expected fault modes are valves blocked open are ok, but valves blocked close break the system. Either way, the result is a system with a significant amount of over-engineering, because many times the required actuation power needs to be installed.
Practical approaches to fault tolerant actuation ignore the dierent fault modes. In a typical application, 2, 3 or 4 actuators are used in parallel, very much like redundant sensors. Each actuator is strong enough to meet the performance requirements by itself, and the impact of some failed actuators on the system is considered negligible. This means a loss of force fault is accounted for, but a solid lockup of an actuator has to be prevented by specic structural measures. The result is a system with a signicant amount of over-engineering, because many times the required actuation power needs to be installed.
The scientic literature also struggles with the distinct implications of actuator faults, with most approaches still based on an information view more suitable for the handling of sensor faults. Recent examples include the extension of the observer-based approach to cover actuator faults in the form of the virtual actuator (Steen, 2005) , and the exploitation of analytical redundancies in the form of dynamic gain scheduling and control allocation (Oppenheimer and Doman, 2006 ).
High Redundancy Actuator. The obvious way to
improve reliability is to use a greater number of actuation elements. To reduce the over-dimensioning involved in this, it is possible to reduce the size and strength of elements, while retaining a reliability advantage. For example, a system with ten elements may still work with only eight of them operational, and the reliability improves because two faults can be accommodated. The overall capacity is only overdimensioned by 25 %. This is a signicant improvement over the use of two full-sized redundant actuators, which leads to 100 % over-dimensioning. The use of an optimal The HRA is inspired by one of nature's answers to fault tolerant actuation: the muscle. It is composed of many individual bres, each of which provides only a minute contribution to the force and the travel of the muscle. This allows the muscle as a whole to be highly resilient to damage of individual bres. In this sense the HRA is a bionic system, because it is inspired by an existing biological solution.
Traditionally, only parallel aggregation is used, which makes the system resilient towards loss of force, but not with respect to lock-up faults (see Figure 2 ). Series aggregation could be used to address lock-up faults, but it does not help with loss of force faults. The HRA is a synthesis of both aggregations, with actuation elements being used both in parallel and in series (see Figure 1 ). This increases the available travel and force over the capability of an individual element, and it makes the actuator resilient to faults where an element becomes loose or locked up. These faults will reduce the overall capability, but they do not render the assembly functionless, and they do not require a change of the control structure as proposed by Jiang et al. (2010) .
Initial research has focused on the modelling and control of simple congurations with four elements (Du et al., 2006 (Du et al., , 2007 . Previous studies on the reliability of electromechanical assemblies are rare: the reliability of electro-mechanical steering is discussed by Blanke and Thomsen (2006) , and electrical machines and power electronics are analysed by Ribeiro et al. (2004) . Neither of these consider the combination of both series and parallel structures together in a single actuator.
This paper presents a method to analyse the reliability of an HRA of any size, as long as it can be interpreted as a hierarchy of parallel and series congurations. The diculty with analysing an HRA is that many faults can occur simultaneously, and the system may still be functional.
Conventional methods of reliability analysis (binary fault trees, event trees, stochastic automata etc) suer from an extreme increase of complexity. The number of cut sets increases exponentially with the system size, and this renders the analysis unmanageable even for reasonably small systems such as a conguration of 10 × 10 elements.
The approach presented here is loosely based on the concepts developed using graph theory in Steen et al. (2007 Steen et al. ( , 2008 . It avoids the issue of complexity by using a multistate system abstraction as used by Jenab and Dhillon (2006) that is independent of the temporal dimension of the problem. Using the principle of divide and conquer, the system is decomposed level by level, relying on simple aggregation laws of low computational complexity. The basic idea was introduced in Steen et al. (2009) , and it is presented here in a much more thorough and comprehensive treatment. The approach is applied to dierent 4×4 congurations for comparison, generalised results are proven about the relative advantages and disadvantages of one conguration over another of the same size, and a discussion of the computational complexity of this approach is included.
1.3. List of Symbols. This paper follows the notation used in the rst part of Pham (2003) , supplemented by the application specic interpretation of the capability c. This leads to the following symbols.
Symbol Meaning
probability of an event q failure probability (unreliability) of an element, typically close to 0 p reliability of an element, typically close to 1 c 
probability of capability c of system x:
reliability of x wrt. the force requirement c f R tx (c t )
reliability of x wrt. the travel requirement c t R f tx (c f , c t ) reliability of x wrt. force requirement c f and travel requirement c t 1.4. Structure of the Paper. Section 2 deals with the basic terms and concepts used for the reliability assessment, and it denes the behaviour of individual actuation elements. In Section 3, the eect of series or parallel arrangement of elements on reliability is investigated. In Section 4, the special cases of series-in-parallel and parallel-in-series congurations are analysed for a simple 2 × 2 system. In Section 6, this concept is extended to congurations with multiple layers, and an exhaustive study of 4 × 4 systems is presented. Section 7 contains further remarks and comparative properties of dierent congurations. The paper nishes with some conclusions in Section 9. 
Specification of Actuation Elements
The individual actuation elements of the HRA are specied using a number of dierent measures. From an abstract perspective, they can be divided into two types: physical measures and reliability measures. The rst kind contains physical parameters related to the mechanical movement, such as force, speed, acceleration, or distance. The second type of parameters describes the probability of a fault. While it is entirely possible to measure the capabilities in physical units (Newton for the force and meter for the travel), this paper will use normalised values instead. The force capability c f and travel capability c t of a nominal element are dened to be one (without unit). This simplies the notation signicantly, and when necessary, the discrete numbers can easily be converted back into physical units. Figure 3b ) and loss of travel (lock-up fault, see Figure 3c ). Both faults are assumed to be total: a fault reduces the relevant capability to zero (see Table 1 and Figure 4) .
For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that both fault modes (loose and lock-up) are independent. This implies 
that they can also appear together, which may seem impossible at rst. However, this analysis is concerned with the guaranteed performance of an element, and it is possible an element fails to deliver force in one situation and travel in another, so that in eect it cannot reliably provide either capability.
In applications where both fault modes are exclusive, a small error is made by these assumptions. Ways to reduce and bound this error will be discussed in Section 5.
It is also assumed that a locked-up element is xed in its neutral position (this would be the medium length if the nominal travel is symmetric to both sides). This assumption is for convenience only and can be relaxed later.
2.3. Specication of Reliability. In practical applications, dierent ways can be used to describe the reliability of an element, such as mean time to failure (MTTF), availability, failure probability over a given time, or failure probability during a specied mission. The relevant specication depends very much on the application. However, all measures are based on probabilities or probability densities over time.
These functions over time can be interpreted using any of the above measures. Therefore, this paper will use fault probabilities as a generic way to measure reliability:
2.4. Capability Distributions. Together with the corresponding OK-probability P (c f = 1) = p f = 1 − q f and P (c t = 1) = p t = 1 − q t , these values dene the two capa-
where i and j are non-negative integer values representing the force and travel capability under consideration. Because there are two capabilities, the state space is two-dimensional as shown in Table 2 . However, to avoid the complexity of two-dimensional distributions, this paper deals with one capability at a time. This separation is possible because both fault modes are assumed to be statistically independent. In some cases, the cumulative capability distributions
are used for determining the reliability of more complex congurations.
As more elements are used together, the capability increases, and the distributions extend to higher values. The reliability can be determined from the distribution by looking up the required performance of the system. This notion of capabilities was developed in Steen et al. (2007) , but the concept of a capability distribution is new.
Aggregation on a Single Level
The main reason for using several elements is that they serve to increase the capabilities (see Figure 5 and Table 1 ).
Two elements in parallel can produce twice the force, and two elements in series can achieve twice the travel. In the following, it is assumed that n equal elements are combined, and that the capability distribution for one individual element is known. The same basic laws of aggregating capabilities are also applicable in many other areas. Reliable rotary actuation can be achieved with velocity and torque adding gears, for example. Electrical systems deal with the dual variables of voltage and current, and series and parallel conguration are commonly used in IGBT (insulated gate bipolar transistor) high power switching devices (Shammas et al., 2006) . Transportation systems and communication networks also have corresponding relations governing throughput and latency. From a reliability perspective, all these systems are essentially identical in that they use series and parallel congurations to increase two dual capabilities of primary concern. actuation elements used in series (see Figure 5b) (1)
where c f denotes the vector (c f 1 c f 2 )
T . The same equation also applies to the travel capability of elements in parallel (2) c tP (c t ) = min{c t1 , c t2 } (see Figure 5a ). These equations follow directly from the specication and physical laws, so they will be assumed as given for the reliability analysis.
In both cases, the capability of such a combined system is the minimum capability over all the subsystems or elements:
This represents a classic series arrangement of multi-state subsystems (MSS), and the reliability has been well studied in the literature. Here, a new operator is introduced to calculate the new cumulative reliability distribution for the overall system. Theorem 1. If n elements with the cumulative reliability distributions R i (c) are connected so that the overall capability is limited by the weakest element according to Eqn. (3), the cumulative reliability distribution R lim (c lim ) of the new system can be calculated as
with the operator
Proof. According to the denition, the reliability R lim (c) is the probability that the overall capability is at least c: 
Since the capability of the elements c i are considered to be independent, the probability of this condition can be calculated as the product of the probabilities of the individual terms:
This is exactly the result dened by the operator .
Since the original Eqn. (3) is applicable in two cases, the same is true for the resulting operator . It can be used to describe the force of elements in series
or the travel for elements in parallel
Remark 1. For a number of n identical elements R(c) = R i (c), the result can be simplied to
If the elements only have the states 0 and 1 (with probabilities r(0) = q and r(1) = p = 1 − q), these results can be simplied further to the following distribution:
For many practical cases, it can be assumed that the probability of a fault q is small compared to the probability of normal operation p. Using the assumption p ≈ 1, this distribution can be (conservatively) approximated as
3.2. Additive Capabilities. If several actuation elements are used together, the capability of the combined system may increase above the capability of any element. In fact, this increase is the motivation for using several elements in the rst place.
In contrast to the minimum operator in Eqn.
(1), the sum applies to the force capability of two elements in parallel (see
and to the travel capability of two elements in series (see Figure 5b ) (15) c tS (c t ) = c t1 + c t2 .
In both cases, the relevant capabilities of the elements add up to the capability of the overall system:
Remark 2. This is unlike typical multi-state systems (Jenab and Dhillon, 2006) , because the state space of the system c add can be larger than the state space of any element c i . So this specic case is not usually treated in the literature on multi-state systems. A similar situation is discussed for two-state systems in the k-out-of-n:G problem, but the k (which corresponds to c add ) is considered given. This is different from the situation with the HRA, where a distribution over k is sought, and therefore k is a variable.
Again, a new operator ⊕ is introduced to calculate the cumulative reliability distribution of the combined system of two elements.
Theorem 2. If n elements with cumulative reliability distributions R i (c i ) are arranged so that the capabilities add up according to Eqn. (16), the cumulative reliability distribution R add (c add ) of the resulting system is dened by
Proof. For this operator, it is easier to work with the reliability distribution r instead of the cumulative reliability distribution R. Because only integer capabilities are used, it follows from the denition of R and r that r(i) = R(i) − R(i + 1). Therefore, the following equation is equivalent to (18):
Central to this proof is the set of all capability combinations c 1 and c 2 that lead to the same overall capability c add = c.
According to Eqn. (16), this set is
The probability of the two elements to have the capabilities
because both are considered to be independent. Now the probability of a given overall capability of c can be calculated as:
which is equivalent to Eqn. (19).
This operator ⊕, too, is applicable in two situations: the force of elements in parallel
and the travel for elements in series
By using this operator ⊕ together with the previous operator it is possible to express all possible aggregations of force and travel via parallel or serial connections.
Remark 3. It is trivial to see that both operators satisfy several basic properties of an algebraic addition such as commutativity, associativity, and the zero and identity element. The zero element is an element that is always so strong that it never limits the overall system, while the identity element delivers no capability at all. In fact, the underlying deterministic calculations of capabilities using Eqns. (3) and (16) form a max-plus algebra. However, the two operators working with stochastic distributions do not satisfy the law of distributivity:
This is caused by the initial assumption that all elements are independent, even if modelled by the same reliability distribution. So the same variable R 1 is interpreted as referring to dierent elements, which are nominally identically, but subject to independent faults. This breaks the law of distributivity, so the two operators and ⊕ do not form an algebraic ring (see Heidergott et al., 2005) . Ring properties could be restored by using multidimensional distributions, but the additional complexity is not warranted in this application.
Hierarchical Aggregation
An HRA contains elements in series and in parallel. Thus it is important to analyse the reliability resulting from multiple levels of aggregations. Assuming that the conguration is given, this section explains how to nd the reliability distribution of the overall system by combining the operators dened above.
Any structure can be analysed using an iterative bottomup approach. From the capability distribution of the individual elements, it is possible to calculate the distributions for the basic subsystems, which are either parallel or series arrangements of elements. Basic subsystems can be aggregated to more complex subsystems, and this can be repeated until the reliability of the overall system is found.
For a successful application of this iterative approach, it is required that the actuator conguration is described as a series-parallel network. This is possible if the HRA can be broken down into series and parallel congurations of subsystems, until the level of individual actuation elements is reached. Not all networks satisfy this condition (a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this paper). In electrical networks, star-triangle conversion is typically used to solve this problem. This is not feasible for the stochastic analysis, because the one-to-one correspondence between faults and elements is lost. Fortunately, non series-parallel networks are rare in mechanical engineering, and an analysis of typical sample congurations has shown that they oer no advantage in terms of reliability, weight or cost. Several examples are shown in Figure 12 . All systems dened by this notation are highly regular and symmetrical, which simplies the analysis considerably. Following the notation from Section 3, the cumulative force capability of a conguration x is denoted with R f x (c f ), and the cumulative travel capability with R tx (c t ). This allows an easy comparison between dierent congurations. In the following, all elements are assumed to be identical as specied using the properties dened in Section 2.
4.2. Iterative Reliability Calculation. In each iterative step, two subsystems with a known reliability distribution are combined to a new system. The conguration of a subsystem is assumed to be x, and the cumulative force and travel reliability distributions are R f x (c f ) and R tx (c t ).
For a parallel conguration (xP) of two subsystems x 1 and x 2 , the force increases (c f 1 + c f 2 ), and the travel is limited by the weaker subsystem (min{c t1 , c t2 }). As discussed in Section 3, the following two operators can be used to calculate the cumulative reliability distributions.
Theorem 3. The cumulative reliability distributions for a system of two nominally identical parallel subsystems are
Similarly, in a series conguration (xS), the force is limited by the weakest element (min{c f 1 , c f 2 }), and the travel increases (c t1 + c t2 ). So the cumulative reliability distributions are determined by the other operator, respectively. Theorem 4. The cumulative reliability distributions for a system of two nominally identical subsystems in series are
Proof. The proofs for these two theorems are analogue to the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 in Section 3. Instead of the two individual elements assumed there, two identical subsystems specied by R f x and R tx are used. These subsystems satisfy all the assumptions made about the elements, including the independence.
By using these four equations iteratively, the reliability distributions of arbitrarily complex congurations can be determined in a straightforward way.
4.3. Reliability Order. It is obvious that some congurations are more reliable than others, even for the same overall size. The following ndings will demonstrate this for the case of force reliability R f , and the case for travel reliability is analogue but inverted.
The fundamental operation is the exchange of an SP conguration for a PS conguration. As shown in Figure 5 , this means the introduction of the cross link in the centre where all four elements come together. Intuitively, this can only increase the reliability of the system. Lemma 1. Exchanging an SP aggregation for a PS aggregation enhances the force reliability:
Proof. The proof is possible by looking at the reliability distributions, but it is much easier on the level of capabilities.
If c 1 to c 4 are the capability of the four subsystem with conguration x, the capability of the xPS conguration c xPS = max(c 1 + c 2 , c 3 + c 4 ) and the capability of the xSP conguration is c xSP = max(c 1 , c 3 ) + max(c 2 , c 4 ) .
It follows that for all c i ≥ 0 c xSP ≥ c xPS .
Due to the monotonicity of capability aggregation, this also holds for the comparison of the full systems c xSPy ≥ c xPSy .
So for every possible fault combination, the conguration xSPy is at least as strong as the conguration xPSy, and therefore the capability distribution will satisfy the relation (28).
This lemma 1 directly leads to a more general theorem for interchanging S and P aggregation for non-adjacent layers.
Theorem 5. Exchanging an earlier (small subsystem) S aggregation with a later (bigger subsystem) P aggregation enhances the force reliability:
Proof. This can be shown by repeatedly applying the lemma above. For this purpose, the rst S in y is moved to the front by repeatedly applying the lemma, then the next S is moved in its place etc., until the S after y can be moved into y, leaving a P in its place. In total |y| + 1 operations are necessary, where |y| is the length of y.
The same conclusion can be found for the travel reliability, except that the eect is the opposite:
Theorem 6. Exchanging an earlier (small subsystem) S aggregation with a later (bigger subsystem) P aggregation reduces the travel reliability:
the proof is analogue to above. Both theorems together demonstrate that selecting the best conguration is a tradeo between robustness towards loose faults and robustness towards lock-up faults.
Approximation of Elements With Exclusive Error Modes
The proposed independent analysis of both fault modes is only valid under the assumption that the fault modes are independent of each other. For many practical applications, the fault modes are exclusive and therefore not independent, and it is important to consider the error introduced by this assumption of independence. The case of both fault modes being present in an element is assumed to be q f q t , but in reality it is 0. There are two principle ways to deal with this discrepancy: on the element level and on the system level.
5.1. Adjustment of Element Probabilities. On the element level, the key problem is that the probability of the fault-free case is (see Table 1 )
whereas the correct (lower) value is
The error q f q t is exactly the probability of the combined fault case.
The proposed solution to avoid this is to add the error to one of the fault probabilities. For example the force error probability can be increased to q f = q f 1 − q t which leads to the correct fault-free probability
The likelihood of a loose fault is overestimated by these, and this leads to a slightly inaccurate but conservative reliability result. The downside of this approach is that the size of the error on the end result is not known (unless a separate calculation is performed without the adjustment).
5.2. Adjustment of Aggregated Reliability. Alternatively a second option can be pursued: it leaves the element fault probabilities unchanged and adjusts the reliability resulting from the aggregation instead to make it conservative. The underlying assumption in this case is that both fault modes are exclusive, both for the elements and for the aggregated system. For the element specication, this leads to three distinct cases:
These are exact probabilities.
For the results of the aggregated system, this assumption of exclusivity is not strictly true, because a specic combination of locked and loose elements could lower both capabilities below the requirements, even if each element exhibits only one failure mode.
While the probabilities of meeting (or not) either capability are known exactly (R f x and R tx ), the overlap between the two cases is not known. If both fault modes were completely independent as assumed above, the probability of both being present could be calculated as (1−R f x )(1−R tx ).
Since both fault modes are exclusive on the element level, the probability for this combined fault mode has to be lower.
The exact value can only be found using a much more involving two dimensional analysis.
By using (1 − R f x )(1 − R tx ) as an upper and 0 as a lower bound, the following bounds can be found for the nal system reliability:
This is based on conservative assumptions only, and therefore the true value is known be within the bounds. The key advantage of this method is that two bounds are given, and makes it possible to quantify the error made by dealing with both fault modes independently.
Example Configurations
Some representative examples of series-parallel congurations will be discussed in this section. The rst two sys- Following the bottom up approach, the cumulative reliability distribution R f S (c) for a single column of two elements in series needs to be determined rst. According to Eqn. (6), the operator is required
and it leads to the result
The computation of these reliabilities is much easier from a numerical perspective if they are expressed in terms of q. Therefore, polynomials in q f will be used to describe them here.
This reliability distribution R f S is used to describe the two columnar subsystems that compose the whole system. This case is particularly simple, because the subsystems are still binary (with capabilities of 0 and 1 only). Eqn. (20) can be used for the parallel arrangement of subsystems with the operator ⊕:
The resulting capability distribution is:
or as polynomials
Under the simplifying assumption q f p f , this can be approximated as
6.2. Force Capability of Parallel in Series. The second example looks at the dual assembly: two elements are used in parallel, and two of these blocks are arranged in series.
The only dierence to the previous assembly is the addition of the cross connection at the middle of the actuator. Now the system can be divided into a top group and a bottom group. The force adds up in each group, but the force capability of the overall system is limited by the weakest group.
This leads to the capability function
For each group of two parallel elements, the Eqn. (20) applies. It leads to
Expanding the resulting polynomials produces
The second step of the analysis is more complicated, because each group is now a multi-state system with three distinct capabilities. Consequently, the simple solution from Eqns.
(10) and (11) 
This leads to the polynomial solution
The resulting equation (43) can also be simplied using the assumption q f p f to the approximation
The dierence between both structures is found by comparing Eqn. (37) For the parallel in series system, the overall force capability is found to be
The general form of the reliability is
and a reasonable rst order approximation is given by
In a similar way, the overall force capability of a series in parallel system is
This leads to a reliability function of
and a rst order approximation of
So the PS conguration is generally superior for when the force is relevant, and the SP conguration is superior for providing a required amount of travel or velocity. The difference between both congurations increases signicantly When the travel or velocity is considered, the roles are interchanged between the SP and the PS conguration (and of course q f is then the failure probability for lock-up faults):
These equations together can also be used to nd the ideal size (n × m) of an HRA. The four design parameters are the two numbers n, m representing the size as well as the required force capabilities c f and c t (determining the degree of redundancy). The strength required for each element can be calculated from these, as can the probability of an HRA failure due to force or travel capabilities below the requirements. Assuming that elements of any strength (force and travel) can be used, these four parameters are the main way of adjusting the reliability of the HRA, while minimising cost and weight. And even if the nominal strength is xed, it is still possible to tune the number of essential elements required to deliver the capability (and therefore the number of redundant elements) to suit the reliability requirements.
6.4. 4×4 Multi-Level Hierarchical Congurations. A central aim of this paper is the analysis of hierarchical congurations with more than two levels, because they oer potentially superior overall reliability due to a better balance of fault modes. A simplifying assumption here is that each level combines two identical subsystems. Any 4 × 4 conguration therefore consists of four levels, two of which are series connections, while the other two parallel connections -the only dierence is the order of aggregation. All six possible congurations are shown in Figure 12 .
In the nominal state, all congurations are identical: both force and travel capability are four times the value of a single element. However, the response to faults diers signicantly because of the existence or absence of lateral connections.
The use of fault trees for analysis an HRA leads to a number of issues. For the SSPP or PPSS congurations, it is possible to perform this analysis with a reasonably concise fault tree by introducing the (non-standard) k-out-of-n Figure 9 . The analysis of mixed conguration such as SPSP (see Figure 8 ) is more complicated, although it already uses shared signals subtrees to reduce the size. This means it is technically no longer a tree, and the number of cut sets can be much larger than the tree suggests. The basic problem is that most fault tree based methods cannot utilise the highly symmetrical structure to avoid repeated computation of symmetric subsystems. Our analysis also shows that two typical approximations are no longer justied: cut sets of more than the minimum size have to be considered because of their large number, and the probability of unaected elements to be not at fault cannot be approximated as 1 without signicant errors. All these issues mean that fault trees with binary signals are not a convenient way of analysing such systems.
A very simple graphical representation can be achieved by following the multi-state view of the system. The operators and ⊕ introduced above in Eqns. (22) and (24) are used to describe the structure of the system. The resulting tree in Figure 11 could be interpreted as an extended fault tree, but it is important to realise that the connections do not represent events (binary variables), but the capability of a subsystem. Classical fault tree analysis is not able to deal with these, while a multi-state systems approach can. The same analysis is applied to all six congurations.
Because of the textual length of the results, the two function are implemented in MATLAB using the symbolic toolbox.
The reliability of a (sub)system is denoted using a vector
T of variable size, and the individual entries are polynomials in q f .
2
The results are shortened by giving only the two relevant elements of this vector, and by omitting coecients of little interest:
2 The MATLAB symbolic toolbox has been used for the automatic manipulation of these polynomials. While MATLAB supports native functions for manipulating polynomials, these operate on vectors, and not rst class polynomial objects. This makes it more dicult to represent the capability distributions. The results for 1 − R f (3) (allowing one eective element fault) are plotted over the element fault probability q f in Figure 13 on a linear scale. Note that the most interesting part is the area of low fault probability (close to 0) and high system reliability (close to 1), therefore the system unreliability 1 − R is shown. To highlight very small values, the same data is shown on a logarithmic scale in Figure 14 .
For comparison, the unreliability 1 − R f (2) (up to two effective element faults) is plotted in Figure 15 . A number of observations are interesting from the point of high redundancy actuation.
(1) All reliability functions have the same polynomial structure: they start at 1, the rst non-constant term is a factor of q 2 f for R f (2) and q 3 f for R f (3), and they contain higher order terms up to q 16 f . This is a consequence of the basic requirements, which can be fullled in every conguration with zero or one faulty element.
(2) The reliabilities maintain a strict order over the con-
for all 0 < q f < 1. So looking only at the force, some congurations are better than others, independent of the parameters. R f (2) only follows a partial order, because the relation between R f PSSP (2) and R f SPPS (2) depends on q f . (3) The reliability of travel (R t (3) and R t (2)) follows the opposite order,
for all q t because of the correspondence R f SSPP = R tPPSS (for corresponding q t = q f ) etc. So the conict between reliable force and reliable travel is conrmed consistently.
Based on these results, it is possible to calculate the failure probability due to insucient force and travel, and then select the best conguration for given reliability values q t This separation is possible, because it is assumed that for the fault behaviour, the elements can be considered independent of each other. Even if this assumption is not exactly met, it is possible to work with a conservative approximation.
Selecting the Best Configuration
The original goal was to nd the best conguration for a given task, and this section will show how the results can be used to compare dierent candidates and to identify the best one. Since there is a trade-o between robustness towards loss of force and robustness towards loss of travel, it is important to remember that both were treated separately only to simplify the analysis. Usually a system would be specied with a force requirement c f and a travel requirement c t . Both have to be met for a functional system. As long as both faults occur independently of each other, the 
However, since both faults are mutually exclusive in a single element, they are not completely independent. Therefore a safe (conservative) approximation is
which also has the advantage of producing less complex results.
For example the SSPP conguration leads to The main advantage of this approach is the very low computational complexity, compared to other methods that get prohibitively expensive even for moderate conguration sizes. This section will discuss the complexity in a bit more detail. Assuming a square conguration, the number of cooperating elements shall be n 1 , and the number of limiting elements shall be n 2 , giving a total of n 1 n 2 elements. The maximum capability in the system is given by n 1 . It is further assumed that the structure is highly symmetric (as in the examples), and it follows that both n 1 and n 2 are powers of 2.
Each basic aggregation operation (as detailed in Theorems 6 and 7 using and ⊕) can be performed in a linear number of basic arithmetic operations, depending on the maximum capability, so it is of complexity order O(n 1 ). Due to the symmetric nature of the structure, each aggregation doubles the number of considered elements, so the number of required aggregations from a single element to the whole system is the dual logarithm of n 1 n 2 or log 2 (n 1 n 2 ). This leads to an overall complexity of O(n 1 log 2 n 1 n 2 ) for determining the system reliability from a given set of fault probabilities. This complexity is so low that the computation can be performed many times to test dierent fault probabilities or congurations. Even systems of size 1000 × 1000 or more are still fast to analyse.
Structures without symmetries or broken symmetries would require further computations up to an order of O(n 1 n 1 n 2 ).
While this is still a low polynomial complexity, there is very little to gain from breaking the symmetry, and the number of congurations to analyse may explode exponentially.
Hence it is not generally recommended.
Traditional methods have a much higher complexity which applied to the HRA, because a large number of faults has to be considered. Without optimisations, a fault tree analysis of the HRA involves O(2 n1n2 ) combinations, which is prohibitive even for reasonably small systems such an 8×8 grid.
Some optimisations are possible, but they do not avoid the basic problem of exponential complexity, which prevents the analysis of larger systems.
An event tree analysis would look at faults in the order of occurance. While this does increase the number of potential combinations, it also allows the elimination of signicant parts of the event tree once the required capabilities are not longer met, since the order of faults is known. The resulting computational complexity is dicult to predict, because the number of faults that can be accommodated varies by fault location. It is bounded by n 1 and n 1 n 2 , where n 1 is the number of cooperating elements required. This means the computational complexity is between O (n1n2)! (n1n2−n 1 )! and O (n1n2)! ((n1−n 1 )n2)! , although further optimisations are possible in symmetric congurations. So this approach can be faster than the fault tree when the requirements are a signicant part of the maximum capability. Again, it seems possible to study medium sized systems such as 8 × 8 with high capability requirements (≥ 6), but it quickly becomes prohibitively expensive above this number.
The conclusion is that the presented approach oers radically lower computational complexity than the alternatives, combined with a very simple implementation. This makes it especially suitable for the early design states, where the size of elements and their conguration is studied. Other, more accurate methods may still be useful for verication purposes.
Conclusions
This document has shown how to calculate the reliability of an HRA. Due to the high number of actuation elements, a new generic approach had to be developed. Using probability distributions, the problem can be solved with a low computational eort and using well understood operations. This is achieved by using a number of abstractions and approximating assumptions. Engineers.
